Adverse Patient Safety Events During the COVID-19 Epidemic.

METHODS: A retrospective descriptive analysis of patient safety events related to COVID-19 was performed on data that were submitted in the Joint Patient Safety Event Reporting System and Root Cause Analysis databases to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety from March 2020 to February 2021. Events were coded for type of event, location, and cause of event. RESULTS: Delays in care and staff/patients exposed to COVID-19 were the most common types of patient safety events, followed by COVID-19-positive patients eloping, laboratory processing errors, and one wrong procedure. The most frequently cited locations where events took place were emergency departments, medical units, community living centers, and intensive care units. Confusion over procedures, care not provided because of COVID-19, and failure to identify COVID-positive patient before they exposed others to COVID were the most common causes for patient safety events. DISCUSSION: Our results are similar to other studies of patient safety during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on these results, we recommend the following: (1) focus on patient safety culture, leadership, and governance; (2) proactively develop competency checklists, cognitive aids, and other tools for healthcare staff who are working in new or unfamiliar clinical settings; (3) augment or enhance communication efforts with patient safety huddles or briefings at all levels within a healthcare organization to proactively uncover risk and mitigate fear by explaining changes in policies and procedures; and (4) maximize the use of quality and patient safety experts who are knowledgeable in system and human factor theories as well as change management to assist in redesigning clinical workflows and processes.

Power Failures During Surgery: A 2000-2019 Review of Reported Events in the Veterans Health Administration.

OBJECTIVES: The frequency and impact of power failure on surgical care over time in a large integrated healthcare system such as the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is unknown. Reducing the likelihood of harm related to these rare but potential catastrophic events is imperative to ensuring patient safety and high-quality surgical care. This study provides analysis and description of reported power failures during surgery (January 2000-March 2019), in the VHA and their impact. METHODS: This quality improvement study describes patient safety adverse events related to power failure in the operating room reported by 63 VHA medical centers from the approximately 137 VHAs with a surgical program. Power failure events during surgery reported to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety are analyzed. RESULTS: The authors identify 20 root cause analyses and 135 safety reports. Most events 36.1% (n = 56) resulted from generator delay, equipment reboot delay 21.9% (n = 34), and equipment backup power failure 13.5% (n = 21). Root causes include issues with backup batteries or equipment, engineering and clinical staff communication, standardized procedures for testing power, backup power delay, electrical circuit issues, documentation, and training. Patient harm occurred in 18% (n = 28) and 3.9% (n = 6) as major or catastrophic. CONCLUSIONS: Power failure during surgery is associated with major or catastrophic patient harm, though rare. Staff preoccupation with failure, disaster preparedness, and focus on communication has the potential to minimize or avoid patient harm.

Sharing Lessons Learned to Prevent Adverse Events in Anesthesiology Nationwide.

OBJECTIVES: The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) lessons learned process for Anesthesia adverse events was developed to alert the field to the occurrences and prevention of actual adverse events. This article details this quality improvement project and perceived impact. METHODS: As part of ongoing quality improvement, root cause analysis related to anesthesiology care are routinely reported to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety. Since May 2012, the National Anesthesia Service subject matter experts, in collaboration with National Center for Patient Safety, review actual adverse events in anesthesiology and detailed lessons learned are developed. A survey of anesthesiology chiefs to determine perceived usefulness and accessibility of the project was conducted in April 2018. RESULTS: The distributed survey yielded a response rate of 69% (84/122). Most of those who have seen the lessons learned (85%, 71/84) found them valuable. Ninety percent of those aware of the lessons learned (64/71) shared them with staff and 75% (53/71) reported a changed or reinforced patient safety behavior in their facility. The lessons learned provided 72% (51/71) of chiefs with new knowledge about patient safety and 75% (53/71) gained new knowledge for preventing adverse events. CONCLUSIONS: This nationwide VHA anesthesiology lessons learned project illustrates the tenets of a learning organization. implementing team and systems-based safeguards to mitigate risk of harm from inevitable human error. Sharing lessons learned provides opportunities for clinician peer-to-peer learning, communication, and proactive approaches to prevent future similar errors.

Retained Guidewires in the Veterans Health Administration: Getting to the Root of the Problem.

OBJECTIVES: The aims of this study were to investigate the demographics, causes, and contributing factors of retained guidewires (GWs) and to make specific recommendations for their prevention. METHODS: The Veterans Administration patient safety reporting system database for 2000-2016 was queried for cases of retained GWs (RGWs). Data extracted for each case included procedure location, provider experience, insertion site, urgency, time to discovery, root causes, and corrective actions taken. RESULTS: There were 101 evaluable cases of RGWs. Resident trainee (36%), critical care unit (38%), femoral vein (44%), and nonemergent placement (79%) were the conditions most frequently associated with a RGW. While discovery occurred almost immediately (30%) or in next 24 hours (31%), there were instances of RGWs found months (2%) or years (3%) later. Common root causes included inexperience (46%), lack of standardization (35%), distractions (25%), and lack of a checklist (23%). CONCLUSIONS: The results demonstrate the result of human factors-based errors such as posttask completion errors. We recommend human factor-based interventions such as checklists and devices employing forcing functions that do not allow clinicians to complete the insertion process without first removing the GW.

Root Cause Analysis of Reported Patient Falls in ORs in the Veterans Health Administration.

This quality improvement project describes 22 OR patient falls reported in the Veterans Health Administration between January 2010 and February 2016. Most (n = 15; 68%) involved patient falls from the OR bed. Other patient falls (n = 6; 27%) occurred when the patient was transferred to or from the OR bed, and one fall (5%) occurred at another time. Root causes of the falls included tilting of the OR bed, issues with safety restraints, malfunctioning OR bed or gurney locks, inadequate patient sedation, and poor communication among team members. One fall (5%) resulted in a major injury, four falls (18%) resulted in minor injuries, six falls resulted in no injury, and 11 falls (50%) had no reported outcome. Falls in the OR, although rare, can be injurious. We drafted recommendations based on the root causes that include specific guidance on communication, teamwork, best practices, restraints and equipment, and training.

Assessment of Incorrect Surgical Procedures Within and Outside the Operating Room: A Follow-up Study From US Veterans Health Administration Medical Centers.

Importance: Reducing wrong-site surgery is fundamental to safe, high-quality care. This is a follow-up study examining 8 years of reported surgical adverse events and root causes in the nation's largest integrated health care system. Objectives: To provide a follow-up description of incorrect surgical procedures reported from 2010 to 2017 from US Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical centers, compared with the previous studies of 2001 to 2006 and 2006 to 2009, and to recommend actions for future prevention of such events. Design, Setting, and Participants: This quality improvement study describes patient safety adverse events and close calls reported from 86 VHA medical centers from the approximately 130 VHA facilities with a surgical program. The surgical procedures and programs vary in size and complexity from small rural centers to large, complex urban facilities. Procedures occurring between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2017, were included. Data analysis took place in 2018. Main Outcomes and Measures: The categories of incorrect procedure types were wrong patient, side, site (including wrong-level spine), procedure, or implant. Events included those in or out of the operating room, adverse events or close calls, surgical specialty, and harm. These results were compared with the previous studies of VHA-reported wrong-site surgery (2001-2006 and 2006-2009). Results: Our review produced 483 reports (277 adverse events and 206 close calls). The rate of in-operating room (in-OR) reported adverse events with harm has continued to trend downward from 1.74 to 0.47 reported adverse events with harm per 100 000 procedures between 2000 and 2017 based on 6 591 986 in-OR procedures. When in-OR events were examined by discipline as a rate, dentistry had 1.54, neurosurgery had 1.53, and ophthalmology had 1.06 reported in-OR adverse events per 10 000 cases. The overall VHA in-OR rate for adverse events during 2010 to 2017 was 0.53 per 10 000 procedures based on 3 234 514 in-OR procedures. The most common root cause for adverse events was related to issues in performing a comprehensive time-out (28.4%). In these cases, the time-out either was conducted incorrectly or was incomplete in some way. Conclusions and Relevance: Over the period studied, the VHA identified a decrease in the rate of reported adverse events in the OR associated with harm and continued reporting of adverse event close calls. Organizational efforts continue to examine root cause analysis reports, promulgate lessons learned, and enhance policy to promote a culture and behavior that minimizes events and is transparent in reporting occurrences.

Anesthesia Adverse Events Voluntarily Reported in the Veterans Health Administration and Lessons Learned.

BACKGROUND: Anesthesia providers have long been pioneers in patient safety. Despite remarkable efforts, anesthesia errors still occur, resulting in complications, injuries, and even death. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) National Center of Patient Safety uses root cause analysis (RCA) to examine why system-related adverse events occur and how to prevent future similar events. This study describes the types of anesthesia adverse events reported in VHA hospitals and their root causes and preventative actions. METHODS: RCA reports from VHA hospitals from May 30, 2012, to May 1, 2015, were reviewed for root causes, severity of patient outcomes, and actions. These elements were coded by consensus and analyzed using descriptive statistics. RESULTS: During the study period, 3228 RCAs were submitted, of which 292 involved an anesthesia provider. Thirty-six of these were specific to anesthesia care. We reviewed these 36 RCA reports of adverse events specific to anesthesia care. Types of event included medication errors (28%, 10), regional blocks (14%, 5), airway management (14%, 5), skin integrity or position (11%, 4), other (11%, 4), consent issues (8%, 3), equipment (8%, 3), and intravenous access and anesthesia awareness (3%, 1 each). Of the 36 anesthesia events reported, 5 (14%) were identified as being catastrophic, 10 (28%) major, 12 (34%) moderate, and 9 (26%) minor. The majority of root causes identified a need for improved standardization of processes. CONCLUSIONS: This analysis points to the need for systemwide implementation of human factors engineering-based approaches to work toward further eliminating anesthesia-related adverse events. Such actions include standardization of processes, forcing functions, separating storage of look-alike sound-alike medications, limiting stock of high-risk medication strengths, bar coding medications, use of cognitive aids such as checklists, and high-fidelity simulation.

Advanced Practice Nurse-Led Statewide Collaborative to Reduce Falls in Hospitals.

Thirty-eight hospitals participated in falls prevention team training, followed by coaching and mentoring over 3 months to develop unit-based initiatives to reduce falls. Initiatives centered on fall risk assessment, rounding, or postfall assessment. Paired t test of the pre-/postintervention fall rates of 23 of the hospitals revealed reduced fall rates (P < .01). The estimated mean decrease was 1.7 falls per 1000 patient days (95% confidence limits of 0.7-2.7).

Errors upstream and downstream to the Universal Protocol associated with wrong surgery events in the Veterans Health Administration.

BACKGROUND: The Universal Protocol has been associated with the prevention of wrong surgery procedures; however, such events still occur. This article explores wrong surgery events, defined as those incorrect procedures (wrong site, wrong side, wrong procedure, wrong patient, wrong level, wrong implant) that would have occurred despite the Universal Protocol including the performance of a time-out by the surgical team. Understanding why some of these events are not caught by the steps of the Universal Protocol, culminating in the time-out, can help the field to add upstream and downstream safeguards to help prevent these never events. METHODS: The Veterans Health Administration database of root cause analyses was queried for all cases involving an incorrect surgical procedure between 2004 and 2013 to determine the relative frequency and characteristics of wrong surgery events because of errors upstream and downstream to the Universal Protocol. This subgroup of wrong surgery events was selected from among all the wrong surgery events by 2 clinicians with expertise in patient safety (Kappa = .91). RESULTS: Forty-eight cases of wrong surgery events because of upstream/downstream errors were analyzed, representing 16% of the 308 root cause analyses for wrong surgery events reported during this period. Upstream errors included mislabeling of specimens, while downstream errors were associated with ineffective intraoperative process. Surgical procedures that were particularly vulnerable included wrong level spine operations, wrong patient prostatectomies, wrong implant cataract procedures, and wrong site skin lesion excisions. CONCLUSIONS: Wrong surgery events can and do occur despite adherence to Universal Protocol including a time-out. The prevention of incorrect procedures requires complementary safety behaviors and technologies to address errors that occur upstream and downstream to the Universal Protocol and the time-out.

Sharing lessons learned to prevent incorrect surgery.

The purpose of this report is to discuss surgical adverse event lessons learned and to recommend action. Examples of incorrect surgical adverse events managed in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) patient safety system and results of a survey regarding the impact of the surgery lessons learned process are provided. The VHA implemented a process for sharing deidentified stories of surgical lessons learned. The cases are in-operating room selected examples from lessons learned from October 1, 2009, to June 30, 2011. Examples selected illustrate helpful human factors principles. To learn more about the awareness and impact of the lessons learned, we conducted a survey with Chiefs of Surgery in the VHA. The types of examples of adverse events include wrong eye implants, incorrect nerve blocks, and wrong site excisions of lesions. These are accompanied by human factors recommendations and change concepts such as designing the system to prevent mistakes, using differentiation, minimizing handoffs, and standardizing how information is communicated. The survey response rate was 76 per cent (88 of 132). Of those who had seen the surgical lessons learned (76% [67 of 88]), the majority (87%) reported they were valuable and 85% that they changed or reinforced patient safety behaviors in their facility as a result of surgical lessons learned. Simply having a policy will not ensure patient safety. When reviewing adverse events, human factors must be considered as a cause for error and for the failure to follow policy without assigning blame. VHA surgeons reported that the surgery lessons learned were valuable and impacted practice.

Association between implementation of a medical team training program and surgical morbidity.

OBJECTIVE: To determine whether there is an association between the Veterans Health Administration Medical Team Training (MTT) program and surgical morbidity. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: A retrospective health services study was conducted with a contemporaneous control group. Outcome data were obtained from the Veterans Health Administration Surgical Quality Improvement Program. The analysis included aggregated measures representing 119,383 sampled procedures from 74 Veterans Health Administration facilities that provide care to veterans. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The primary outcome measure was the rate of change in annual surgical morbidity rate 1 year after facilities enrolled in the MTT program as compared with 1 year before and compared with the non-MTT program sites. RESULTS: Facilities in the MTT program (n = 42) had a significant decrease of 17% in observed annual surgical morbidity rate (rate ratio, 0.83; 95% CI, 0.79-0.88; P = .01). Facilities not trained (n = 32) had an insignificant decrease of 6% in observed morbidity (rate ratio, 0.94; 95% CI, 0.86-1.05; P = .11). After adjusting for surgical risk, we found a decrease of 15% in morbidity rate for facilities in the MTT program and a decrease of 10% for those not yet in the program. The risk-adjusted annual surgical morbidity rate declined in both groups, and the decline was 20% steeper in the MTT program group (P = .001) after propensity-score matching. The steeper decline in annual surgical morbidity rates was also observed in specific morbidity outcomes, such as surgical infection. CONCLUSION: The Veterans Health Administration MTT program is associated with decreased surgical morbidity.

Briefing guide study: preoperative briefing and postoperative debriefing checklists in the Veterans Health Administration medical team training program.

BACKGROUND: The purpose of this study was to examine the outcomes of checklist-driven preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings during the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical team training program. METHODS: A briefing score (1, never started; 2, started then discontinued; 3, maintained on original targeted cases; 4, expanded to other services; 5, briefing all cases, all services) was established at 10.1 ± .3 months after introduction of the checklist. Outcomes included antibiotic and deep venous thrombosis prophylaxis compliance rates before and after use of the checklist. RESULTS: Antibiotic (97.0% ± .1% vs 92.1% ± 1.5%; P = .01) and deep venous thrombosis (95.7% ± .8% vs 85.1% ± 4.6%; P = .05) prophylaxis compliance rates were higher after initiation of a surgical checklist. CONCLUSIONS: Checklist-driven preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings are associated with improvements in patient safety for surgical patients.

Association between implementation of a medical team training program and surgical mortality.

CONTEXT: There is insufficient information about the effectiveness of medical team training on surgical outcomes. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) implemented a formalized medical team training program for operating room personnel on a national level. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether an association existed between the VHA Medical Team Training program and surgical outcomes. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: A retrospective health services study with a contemporaneous control group was conducted. Outcome data were obtained from the VHA Surgical Quality Improvement Program (VASQIP) and from structured interviews in fiscal years 2006 to 2008. The analysis included 182,409 sampled procedures from 108 VHA facilities that provided care to veterans. The VHA's nationwide training program required briefings and debriefings in the operating room and included checklists as an integral part of this process. The training included 2 months of preparation, a 1-day conference, and 1 year of quarterly coaching interviews MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: The rate of change in the mortality rate 1 year after facilities enrolled in the training program compared with the year before and with nontraining sites. RESULTS: The 74 facilities in the training program experienced an 18% reduction in annual mortality (rate ratio [RR], 0.82; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.76-0.91; P = .01) compared with a 7% decrease among the 34 facilities that had not yet undergone training (RR, 0.93; 95% CI, 0.80-1.06; P = .59). The risk-adjusted mortality rates at baseline were 17 per 1000 procedures per year for the trained facilities and 15 per 1000 procedures per year for the nontrained facilities. At the end of the study, the rates were 14 per 1000 procedures per year for both groups. Propensity matching of the trained and nontrained groups demonstrated that the decline in the risk-adjusted surgical mortality rate was about 50% greater in the training group (RR,1.49; 95% CI, 1.10-2.07; P = .01) than in the nontraining group. A dose-response relationship for additional quarters of the training program was also demonstrated: for every quarter of the training program, a reduction of 0.5 deaths per 1000 procedures occurred (95% CI, 0.2-1.0; P = .001). CONCLUSION: Participation in the VHA Medical Team Training program was associated with lower surgical mortality.

The role of the operating room nurse manager in the successful implementation of preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings in the VHA Medical Team Training Program.

To improve communication within surgical teams, Veterans Health Administration (VHA) implemented a Medical Team Training Program (MTT) based on the principles of crew resource management. One hundred two VHA facilities were analyzed. Nursing leadership participation in the planning stages of the program was compared with outcomes at follow-up. Nurse manager participation in planning was associated with higher rates of implementation of preoperative briefing and postoperative debriefing. Nurse managers are a critical component in the planning phase of team training programs focused on OR clinical staff.

Code debriefing from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Team Training program improves the cardiopulmonary resuscitation code process.

A Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical center developed a brief questionnaire to support the identification of issues and the continuous improvement of the cardiopulmonary resuscitation process and its outcomes.

Medical team training and coaching in the Veterans Health Administration; assessment and impact on the first 32 facilities in the programme.

BACKGROUND: Communication is problematic in healthcare. The Veterans Health Administration is implementing Medical Team Training. The authors describe results of the first 32 of 130 sites to undergo the programme. This report is unique; it provides aggregate results of a crew resource-management programme for numerous facilities. METHODS: Facilities were taught medical team training and implemented briefings, debriefings and other projects. The authors coached teams through consultative phone interviews over a year. Implementation teams self-reported implementation and rated programme impact: 1='no impact' and 5='significant impact.' We used logistic regression to examine implementation of briefing/debriefing. RESULTS: Ninety-seven per cent of facilities implemented briefings and debriefings, and all implemented an additional project. As of the final interview, 73% of OR and 67% of ICU implementation teams self-reported and rated staff impact 4-5. Eighty-six per cent of OR and 82% of ICU implementation teams self-reported and rated patient impact 4-5. Improved teamwork was reported by 84% of OR and 75% of ICU implementation teams. Efficiency improvements were reported by 94% of OR implementation teams. Almost all facilities (97%) reported a success story or avoiding an undesirable event. Sites with lower volume were more likely to conduct briefings/debriefings in all cases for all surgical services (p=0.03). CONCLUSIONS: Sites are implementing the programme with a positive impact on patients and staff, and improving teamwork, efficiency and safety. A unique feature of the programme is that implementation was facilitated through follow-up support. This may have contributed to the early success of the programme.

Predictors of successful implementation of preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings after medical team training.

BACKGROUND: The purpose of this study was to examine which factors at a medical team training learning session predict future success in the implementation of preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings at health care facilities. METHODS: A Likert score rating for physician involvement, leadership support, and composition of the implementation team was recorded for 64 VHA facilities at the time of a learning session by 3 medical team training educators. At a mean follow-up period of 8.2 months (standard error, .4 mo), a briefing score was established from quarterly semistructured interviews with the facility's implementation team. RESULTS: In a multivariable regression, leadership involvement at the time of the learning session was the best predictor of future briefing/debriefing success (R = .34, P = .03). CONCLUSIONS: Full implementation of the patient safety tool preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings is dependent on facility leadership support.